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Abstract
Different aspects and approaches to commonsense reason-
ing have been investigated in order to provide solutions for
theWinograd Schema Challenge (WSC). The vast complexi-
ties of natural language processing (parsing, assigning word
sense, integrating context, pragmatics and world-knowledge,
...) give broad appeal to systems based on statistical analysis
of corpora. However, solutions based purely on learning from
corpora are not currently able to capture the semantics under-
lying the WSC – which was intended to provide problems
whose solution requires knowledge and reasoning, rather than
statistical analysis of superficial lexical features. In this paper
we consider the WSC as a means for highlighting challenges
in the field of commonsense reasoning more generally. We be-
gin by discussing issues with current approaches to the WSC.
Following this we outline some key challenges faced, in par-
ticular highlighting the importance of dealing with pragmatics.
We then argue for an alternative approach which favours the
use of knowledge bases where the deep semantics of the dif-
ferent interpretations of commonsense terms are formalised.
Furthermore, we suggest using heuristic approaches based on
pragmatics to determine appropriate configurations of both
reasonable interpretations of terms and necessary assumptions
about the world.
Introduction
TheWinograd Schema Challenge (Levesque, Davis, and Mor-
genstern 2012) was conceived as a new benchmark in arti-
ficial intelligence, which would improve on the Turing Test
(Turing 1950) by removing the need for deception and focus-
ing more on understanding. The task is a particular type of
pronoun disambiguation problem. Sentences with a pronoun
and two candidate referents are given, and the task is to find
the correct referent of the pronoun. As the challenge is in-
tended to require genuine intelligence and understanding, the
sentences are supposed to be constructed in such a way that
syntactic constraints and semantic preference do not alone
enable the disambiguation. This construction is achieved in
part by finding pairs of sentences, differing only by one word
but where the pronoun reference is different. For example:
The large ball crashed right through the table because
it was made of [steel/styrofoam]. What was made of
[steel/styrofoam]? Answers: The ball/the table.1 (1)
1Taken from www.cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/
The pronoun ‘it’ refers to either the ball or the table de-
pending on whether ‘steel’ or ‘styrofoam’ is used. In both
cases the syntactic structure remains the same and, supposing
that clear semantic preferences relating ‘steel’ and ‘crashing
through things’ or ‘styrofoam’ and ‘being crashed through’
cannot be easily learned from mining a large corpus, it is
hoped that any system which resolves the pronoun must use
some sort of genuine understanding.
In the literature discussing the WSC and its motivation as
a benchmark we see example reasoning processes incorporat-
ing detailed semantics of the language involved (Davis 2013;
Levesque 2014; Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012;
Morgenstern and Ortiz Jr 2015). This kind of approach how-
ever has not been at the forefront of proposals to the chal-
lenge. This is in large part due to the enormous complexity of
dealing with natural language and constructing large enough
knowledge bases to handle such varied contexts.
In order to further the symbolic approach we investigate
some problems faced, mainly pragmatics. It is hoped that this
sort of analysis helps to shed light on what kind of reasoning
is needed where; and that heuristic methods will remove a
large portion of the burden of reasoning about natural lan-
guage. Along similar lines, a partial solution is provided in
(Schu¨ller 2014), using relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson
2004) to motivate selection of the best knowledge graph to
describe a sentence.
In this paper we first explore what kind of reasoning ca-
pabilities we expect a system to display when solving the
WSC and we analyse how some of the proposed approaches
compare to this. We then consider some key challenges for
solving the WSC using reasoning we consider appropriate;
in particular, that pragmatics and context are very difficult to
capture and semantics are hard to formalize due to vagueness.
Finally, we show how pragmatic considerations can help in
solving the WSC, specifically we consider how prototype the-
ory and heuristic methods can be used to support symbolic
approaches.
What kind of reasoning are we looking for?
We first consider the example above (1) given in (Levesque
2014), using the word ‘styrofoam’. Humans would success-
fully resolve this by knowing particular properties of sty-
papers/WinogradSchemas/WSCollection
rofoam, maybe some naive physics and even some general
properties of balls and tables.
Levesque then considers what should be the outcome if
we change styrofoam to XYZZY, where XYZZY is some
material that we are given some facts about, one of the facts
being ‘It is ninety-eight percent air, making it lightweight and
buoyant’. Given this fact, humans would be able to reason
that the table is made of XYZZY. This is a part of intelligent
behaviour that we would like to replicate, and is clearly de-
pendent on having and being able to reason about detailed
knowledge. Further, it has been suggested as a possible exten-
sion to the test to add a requirement for the solution to provide
a simple explanation of its choice (Morgenstern and Ortiz Jr
2015). This need for explanation would also seem to depend
on reasoning with detailed knowledge; in order to explain
why the table is made of styrofoam, it seems necessary to
have an understanding of the mechanics of the situation. The
ability to provide an explanation is also important more gener-
ally for the field of commonsense reasoning, for example for
decision support systems that need to provide justifications
for decisions (Hayes-Roth, Waterman, and Lenat 1984).
Versatile solutions
The WSC was conceived as a new benchmark for artificial
intelligence; as such, we hope that solutions to the WSC will
provide tools for tackling a broader range of question answer-
ing tasks and commonsense challenges. In this way, solutions
to the challenge should display versatility as well as making
advances in the WSC specifically, thus representing genuine
progress towards truly intelligent machines. Solutions which
are over-specific to the WSC and only provide insight into
this narrow set of coreference resolution problems are not
likely to be ‘engaging in behaviour that we would say shows
thinking in people’ (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012).
This is a similar but more general requirement than elabora-
tion tolerance (McCarthy 1998).
The situations described in Winograd sentences (WS) are
generally common/normal occurrences; however, it is desir-
able for AI systems to be able to reason about out-of-place
objects and strange scenarios. The ability to do this displays
a genuine understanding of what is going on. Levesque gives
the example ‘Can a crocodile run a steeplechase?’ (Levesque
2014). Most humans would answer this easily using ba-
sic knowledge about crocodiles (in particular that they can-
not jump) and what is necessary to be able to complete a
steeplechase. Of course, as noted by Levesque, a statistical
approach using the closed world assumption would be likely
to get the right answer to this question too as there is little ev-
idence of crocodiles running steeplechases. It would be less
likely however to answer the question correctly if the animal
was a gazelle (which presumably could run a steeplechase).
Having briefly considered the kind of solutions we are
aiming for, we now look at how some existing approaches
compare to this.
Existing approaches to the challenge
Since the inception of the WSC there has been some the-
oretical discussion on the purpose of the challenge (Davis
and Marcus 2015; Levesque 2014; 2017), various methods
suggested for tackling the problem (Sharma et al. 2015;
Schu¨ller 2014; Bailey et al. 2015; Rahman and Ng 2012;
Peng, Khashabi, and Roth 2015), and four implementa-
tions entered into the 2016 challenge2 (Liu et al. 2016;
Isaak and Michael 2016) (two of the competitors did not
release papers). The WSC is a particular type of anaphora res-
olution task, on which there has been much work done in the
natural language processing community already (Ng 2017;
Mitkov 2014; Carbonell and Brown 1988); however due to
the nature of the task, necessitating the use of world knowl-
edge, the methods employed are not wholly suitable for the
challenge.
Formalizing the necessary aspects of reasoning to tackle
the WSC (spatial, temporal, causal, epistemic, ...) and inte-
grating them in one system is notoriously hard. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the space of genuine proposed solutions
is sparse, and that existing approaches are mostly based on
statistical methods, that circumvent the need for a precise
understanding of the semantics of the schemas by learning
likely answers from text corpora.
In this section we analyse some of the solutions proposed
along these lines. We consider both their performance and
success on the challenge and also their achievements and
relevance for broader commonsense reasoning, which is the
ultimate aim of the WSC as a benchmark.
Machine learning approaches
Machine learning methods for anaphora resolution have been
used extensively over the past two decades (Ng 2017). In this
section we consider some of the best known such approaches
for tackling the WSC.
The team that came first in the 2016 WSC challenge2 used
‘Commonsense Knowledge Enhanced Embeddings’ (Liu et al.
2016) which works by learning word representation vectors
from large text corpora while incorporating commonsense
knowledge as constraints in the training process. For the
competition the commonsense knowledge was obtained from
CauseCom— a set of cause and effect pairs such as ‘winning
causes happiness’ (Liu et al. 2016) — though the team has
also incorporated WordNet (Miller 1995) and ConceptNet
(Speer and Havasi 2012). A neural network is then trained
to answer yes or no when given candidate/pronouns pairs
(as vectors), and this network is then used to answer new
disambiguation problems.
Though achieving a good performance on the challenge,
it would be down to chance whether it correctly answers the
XYZZY problem given by Levesque, whether it could be
used to solve the crocodile-steeplechase problem, or in future
how it could be developed to explain how it comes to the
conclusion.
Rahman and Ng (2012) have worked combining multi-
ple methods to resolve the pronoun for a large corpus of
WSs. This work achieved high results on their corpus, 73.1%.
However, the corpus selection has been criticized for contain-
ing redundancy (Sharma 2014). Further, the approach relies
2www.cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/papers/
WinogradSchemas/WS.html
heavily on statistical methods for assessing the semantic pref-
erences of types and events e.g. a lion is a type of predator
and being the subject of a kill event makes one more likely
to be the object of an arrest event. It is clear that ‘lions eat
zebras because they are predators’ is not a ‘Google-proof’
WS and should be discarded. When such type distinctions
are not useful, the system may rely on FrameNet (Baker,
Fillmore, and Lowe 1998); in the case of ‘John killed Jim
so he was arrested’, FrameNet gives John the role of ‘killer’
and Jim the role of ‘victim’ and the system, using statistical
methods, concludes that it is more likely for a ‘killer’ (John)
to be arrested. In this case the system resolves the pronoun
successfully. However, this takes no account of the impor-
tance of the connective: changing the sentence to ‘John killed
Jim after he was arrested’ should force one to re-evaluate the
disambiguation.
Work by Peng et al. (2015) has been successful, achieving
higher results (76.4%) than Rahman and Ng on the same
corpus. The technique is similar to the FrameNet approach of
(Rahman and Ng 2012) but they also take connectives into ac-
count. This approach can give crude, and clearly problematic,
forms of knowledge such as ‘{flower has pollen} is more
likely than {bee has pollen}’; to more reasonable knowledge
such as ‘the subject of “be afraid of ” is more likely than the
object of “be afraid of ” to be the subject of “get scared of ”’.
Though these sorts of techniques will likely prove very useful
for natural language processing, and may even manage to
pass the WSC, there is a fundamental issue that these tech-
niques are learning about the likelihood of combinations of
words in corpora and there appears to be little in the way of
transferable knowledge or understanding. For example, it is
clear that the kind of background knowledge necessary to
solve the crocodile-steeplechase problem is not present.
Rather than applying reasoning to knowledge, these tech-
niques are geared towards mining what we may call com-
monsense rules. We discuss the nature of such rules in the
following section.
Commonsense rules
It is clear that, in the WSC, it appears possible to resolve
pronoun ambiguity through an appeal to normality — heavy
things cannot be lifted, younger people are fitter, useless
objects go in the bin while useful tools are kept in storage
etc... Hence, a large part of the suggested approaches to the
WSC have been about ways of finding and/or incorporating
such ‘commonsense rules’. We believe, however, that this is
a rather crude view of commonsense reasoning and outline
some problems of these approaches below.
One proposed approach is that we reduce some of the im-
plied causation in WSs to correlation (Bailey et al. 2015).
This uses ‘correlation formulas’ of the form F ⊕ G, such
as ‘fit into(x, y) ⊕ large(y)’ to say that ‘stuff fitting into y’
is correlated with ‘y being large’. Some inference rules are
given governing such correlation formulas and it is shown
how these could be used to justify a solution to a WS. This ap-
proach is however problematic. It is analogous to a discussion
in (Bunt and Black 2000) — by reducing to mere convention
the reason why ‘There is a howling gale in here!’ is under-
stood as a command to close the window, we are oversimpli-
fying and missing out more important reasoning processes,
including context. Similarly, if we were to find a list of com-
monsense correlations like ‘fit into(x, y)⊕ large(y)’ through
corpus mining, we are ripping the words out of context and
may be missing out important reasoning processes.
This is not to say that conventions do not exist or form an
important part of commonsense reasoning. Natural language
is full of conventions that we may rely upon to communicate.
For example, considering the sentence ‘Sam chopped down
the tree’ there is a default assumption that the chopping is
done with an axe. This kind of convention can be considered
as part of linguistic knowledge (Pustejovsky 1991). However,
reasoning based solely on conventions may be too crude, as it
does not take contextual factors into consideration. Say that
we know that Sam is holding a sword, then we may reject
the default assumption that Sam chops down the tree with
an axe. One way of dealing with the context dependency of
such conventions may be to apply context frames, as in (Mc-
Carthy 1993), i.e. in the context of Sam holding a sword, the
statement ‘Sam chopped down the tree’ suggests that Sam
did the chopping with a sword rather than an axe. However,
even if we can create appropriate context frames using salient
aspects of context, it seems that the process of creating con-
vention/context pairs would continue ad infinitum. We would
hope that reasoning removes the necessity for a lot of these
rules e.g. when someone is holding an appropriate tool, T, for
performing action, A, and we are told that they performed
action A, then we can assume that they have used T to do A.
The tactic for many approaches is to begin by learning
commonsense knowledge from large text corpora or by inte-
grating natural language knowledge bases. Part of the appeal
of this is that knowledge can be exploited without having to
translate between formal and natural language. However, the
methods for extracting commonsense knowledge from the
Web can be problematic. Language is used in an efficient way
and commonsense knowledge is often left implicit (Schu¨ller
and Kazmi 2015).
Even if we were able to overcome some of the problems of
mining commonsense, do we want to use reasoning that relies
solely on these correlations and rules? Though they may be
helpful for certain applications, the reasoning mechanisms
need to incorporate less crude knowledge. Regarding the
desire for versatility and considering some of the problems
listed on the Common Sense Problem Page3, it is clear that
this approach is over-specific to the WSC. It would also
clearly be hard to mine relations between crocodiles and
steeplechases in this way! Moreover, any explanation of the
disambiguation given by such a system would not be very
enlightening. Considering schema (1) with ‘steel’; explaining
why ‘it’ refers to the ball by saying that ‘steel things are more
likely to crash through things than to be crashed through’ is
not a reasonable explanation. Even the ability to cite a salient
property of steel like ‘steel is hard’ would be an important
improvement.
The approaches outlined above at best only incorporate
shallow semantic features and do not appear to exhibit the
3www-formal.stanford.edu/leora/
commonsense/
kind of intelligent behaviour the challenge was designed to
test. We believe that, in order to carry out complex infer-
ences and really understand the world, some definitions of
the natural language in terms of more refined primitives is
often necessary. It is necessary to have genuine world knowl-
edge of entities, as well as their physical, social/historical
and functional attributes, as in (Bennett 2005), and be able
to reason about that knowledge, e.g. crocodiles have short
legs and long bodies, making them unsuitable candidates
for a steeplechase, rather than superficial knowledge about
relations between entities which are mined from corpora, e.g.
crocodiles do not run steeplechases. A line may be drawn
by the distinction between reasoning from first principles
and reasoning by analogy. They can both be valid forms of
reasoning, but reasoning by analogy alone is not enough to
be considered intelligent.
Key challenges
This section outlines some particular problems that need
resolving in order to tackle the WSC and for commonsense
reasoning systems more generally.
Pragmatics
A large part of the complexity of the WSC comes from prag-
matic considerations. There are varying positions on the defi-
nition of pragmatics (Carston 1999), however it is generally
understood as the field concerned with extra-linguistic fac-
tors, such as context, and how they allow the understanding
of a speaker’s intended meaning.
Semantic considerations are clearly essential but they are
generally not enough in order to reach a conclusion about
the disambiguation for a WS. This is an example of semantic
underdeterminacy— that from only considering the literal
meanings of terms in a sentence and not accounting for the
intended meaning, we do not obtain a truth-evaluable propo-
sition. For example, the sentence ‘Tom threw his school bag
down to Ray after he reached the top of the stairs’ does not
contain much information if we only consider the semantics.
We also need to consider the intention of the speaker and we
may infer this from the decisions the speaker takes regarding
the specific choice of language, what information is omitted,
what is left ambiguous, the phrasing of the sentence etc...
Indeed, Kempson argues that ‘the articulation of semantics
[does not alone] provide the full propositional content/logical
form/truth conditions expressed by a sentence’(Kempson
1984).
To evidence this view, we can see that for many WSs
wrongly disambiguating the pronoun does not necessarily
violate world knowledge. For example, when dealing with
the sentence:
The trophy does not fit into the suitcase because itx is
too large1 (2)
there are various interpretations of ‘large’ which give no
definite disambiguation. If we imagine a trophy and suitcase
to be vase-shaped, with a wide base, narrow stem and wide
top, and that the trophy fits into the suitcase, it is possible that
making the suitcase larger via a scale projection would make
the trophy no longer fit. It is in part by making pragmatic
considerations that we can assign appropriate interpretations
to these terms and thus disambiguate the pronoun.
Moreover, even in the sentences where each term can be
precisely and appropriately defined we can still have seman-
tic underdeterminacy. Is it often the case that an utterance is
not totally explicit and leaves the reader to fill in the gaps
with available assumptions and inferences (Carston 1999).
One of the ways that a hearer may fill in these gaps and in-
fer a speaker’s intention is by assuming Grice’s Maxims for
co-operative communication (Grice 1975); e.g. the ‘Quantity
Maxim’, stating: ‘Make your contribution as informative as is
required’ and ‘Do not make your contribution more informa-
tive than is required’. So for instance, if a speaker goes into a
lot of detail when making an utterance, we may assume that
there is particular reason for this and can infer things based
on this knowledge. This kind of pragmatic inference is also
important for written text, and hence the WSC. Therefore, as
it stands, any solution to the WSC needs some mechanisms
for coping with this implicit knowledge.
In the next section we consider some particular examples
of this sort of inference when addressing a WS.
Assumptions about the world
When facing any WS there are multiple commonsense princi-
ples that apply which allow us to create an accurate model of
the situation. What we aim to achieve is some guidance on
how to choose these principles and when they apply. To this
end we examine the following WS:
Tom threw his school bag down to Ray after hex
reached the [top/bottom] of the stairs. Who reached the
[top/bottom] of the stairs? Answer: top: Tom. bottom:
Ray.1 (3)
We will use this example to help elucidate some of the
complexities faced, including the initial position of objects
and relevant objects.
The main idea of this sentence is that to throw something
down to someone, that person must be below you. We then
use the idea of what it means to be at the top of something,
i.e. that if Ray is at the top of the stairs then he cannot be
below Tom. This is however not as clear as it seems.
Initial position It is possible that Tom is on some balcony
above the stairs and waits for Ray to reach the top of the stairs
before throwing the bag down to Ray. So why do we like
the answer ‘Tom’? It appears we assume that Tom and Ray
are initially in a similar location, or to be more precise, that
they both have the same relation to any given landmark — in
this case the stairs. Character x reaching the top of the stairs
implies that x has moved upwards. Not given any information
on the other character, y, we assume they have not moved
and so x is likely to be above y.
Alternatively, x may have been walking along a corridor
to reach the top of the stairs. In this scenario we have two
locations to consider, the corridor and the stairs. We suppose
that Tom and Ray are on the stairs or in the corridor. In this
case it would make no sense for Ray to be at the top of the
stairs, as then Tom would not be able to throw anything down
to him (from the corridor or the stairs); so we suppose that it
must be Tom who walks along the corridor to reach the top
of the stairs and throw the bag down to Tom.
We appeal to a rule that in some narrative, unless we have
reason to infer otherwise, characters are nearby/in the same
place. This idea can be explained by Grice’s quantity maxim
i.e. there is no pertinent difference in the positions of either
Tom or Ray; if there were then the quantity maxim says it
should be made known.
This rule however does not always hold. Imagine we re-
place ‘stairs’ with ‘swimming pool’:
Tom threw his school bag down to Ray after hex reached
the top of the swimming pool. Who reached the top of
the swimming pool? Answer: Ray.
In this scenario x reaches the top of the swimming pool,
breaking the surface of the water. x is then not in a position
to throw something like a school bag downwards, as it is
pretty hard to throw textile objects through water. Hence, we
imagine that x is not Tom, but Ray, and that Tom must be
stood somewhere above the swimming pool.
Relevant objects In general in the WSC to come to a con-
clusion we only need to reason about entities that are explic-
itly mentioned. In the school bag example we reason about
the two characters in the narrative, Tom and Ray, the staircase
and the school bag itself. Combining knowledge of actions
like ‘throwing’ ‘reaching the top of’ etc.. with knowledge of
these objects. In general then, we do not need to appeal to
the existence of extra entities in order to come to a conclu-
sion. This can also be explained by the quantity maxim, the
sentence should provide the necessary objects for the reader
to make sense of the sentence.
However, as previously discussed, certain words or phras-
ings indirectly suggest the existence of certain entities, as
in the ‘Sam chopped down the tree’ example. We can in
part account for these entities by encoding into a lexicon
(Pustejovsky 1991), though these are conventions that will
not always hold. Therefore a defeasible reasoning process is
necessary to select the most appropriate interpretation.
To conclude our discussion about assumptions about the
world, we see that appropriate assumptions need to be made
in order to reach the right conclusion. Further, we believe that,
to varying extents, these kinds of considerations arise when
analysing most WSs appearing in the collection maintained
by Davis1. However, the assumptions are dependent on the
specific situation and we need to discern somehow when the
assumptions are appropriate. Deciding when to accept these
assumptions should include pragmatic considerations. For
example, it is lexical and semantic knowledge that suggest
the existence of an axe in the sentence ‘Sam chopped down
the tree’, however it is a pragmatic task to actually infer
this. This motivates a heuristic process which incorporates
pragmatics and gives preference to default assumptions, we
will discuss this idea later.
Formalizing commonsense knowledge: level of
detail and vagueness
An important issue is to recognize the level of semantics that
one believes is appropriate for a solution to the WSC. Our
discussion so far has motivated a detailed level of knowledge.
Further, there is evidence that, even for coreference prob-
lems that would be considered easy with respect to the WSC,
incorporating shallow semantic features is not enough (Dur-
rett and Klein 2013). Yet, if we are to solve the WSC using
deeper semantics, it is clear that the necessary commonsense
knowledge would involve the formalization of a notoriously
extensive knowledge base. How to obtain and organize such
a large knowledge base is unclear.
On the one hand, due to the variety and scope necessary,
mining commonsense knowledge is appealing; however, as
previously discussed, the available methods and nature of
text corpora pose limitations to obtaining deep knowledge,
which is complex and commonly not explicit. On the other
hand, hand crafted knowledge bases such as CYC (Lenat
1995), which incorporate a deeper level of knowledge, have
had limited success and it is not clear how they should be
exploited.
Beyond the problem of its acquisition, it is well known that
commonsense knowledge is hard to formalize, particularly if
the required level of detail involves the semantics of natural
terms to be preserved. Vagueness and ambiguity are inherent
to natural language and, for that reason, it is problematic
to prescribe single strict interpretations to natural terms. To
illustrate this, consider the WS (3) and imagine the case of
a naive definition of a relation at the top of (x, y) ≡ x is on
y and for any z which is part of y, x is not below z. We see
that this fails for multiple reasons.
1. If Tom were one step below the very last one, it could still
be considered that he is at the top of the stairs, particularly
if Ray were well below him. We call it sorites vagueness
when there is a the lack of a clear threshold of application
of a term.
2. If we change ‘stairs’ to ‘building’ we might say that
Tom is at the top of a building because he is on the top
floor, rather than on the roof. In that case we are shift-
ing the interpretation of the predicate to something like
at the top of (x, y) ≡ z is the top part of y and x is on
z. There may also be many admissible interpretations of
what it means for z to be the top part of y. We call the
multiplicity of conceptually distinct interpretations of nat-
ural terms conceptual vagueness. Further discussion on
the multiple interpretations of natural language terms and
their role in knowledge bases and ontologies can be found
in (Bennett 2005).
Much of the work done in acquiring commonsense knowl-
edge circumvents vagueness in different ways, such as us-
ing shallow semantics or microtheories that do not need to
be consistent with one another. Various theories, however,
have been proposed for dealing with vagueness. Fuzzy logic
(Zadeh 1965) stands as an intuitive solution for modelling
sorites vagueness by assigning degrees of truth. More in-
teresting for this research, supervaluation semantics (Fine
1975) is based on the idea that vague language can be inter-
preted in many different precise ways, each of which can be
logically conceptualised in a precisification (Bennett 2001;
Go´mez A´lvarez and Bennett 2017), thus also offering support
for modelling conceptual vagueness.
So where do all these considerations lead us? In order to
reach the kind of solution we desire, we must be able to deal
with semantic underdeterminacy — part of which involves
deciding when to use appropriate commonsense assumptions
— and also make use of a vast amount of detailed knowledge
while dealing with the associated problems of vagueness.
With these issues in mind, we now consider some avenues
for further work.
The role of pragmatics in solving the WSC
In the previous sections we have highlighted how current
approaches, regardless of their success in solving schemas,
have provided limited support for the kind of intelligent be-
haviour that we would like to replicate. Here, in an attempt
to account for some of the key challenges, we propose an
alternative approach, favouring the use of knowledge bases
where the deep semantics of the different interpretations of
commonsense terms are formalised. Furthermore, we suggest
using heuristic approaches based on pragmatics to determine,
in the context of each particular schema, appropriate config-
urations of both reasonable interpretations of the terms and
necessary assumptions about the world.
For this purpose we first motivate the use of prototypes
for categories and relations and then develop how heuristic
methods can provide a manageable way of using pragmatic
knowledge for the disambiguation of WSs.
Appealing to prototypicality
There is various work in pragmatics and cognitive science
highlighting the importance of using prototypes: in utterance
interpretation defaults are assigned before contextual and
pragmatic considerations are taken into account (Levinson
1995; Recanati 2004) and there is also evidence for the human
preference for good examples (prototypes) of some category
as opposed to boundary cases and, further, that prototypes are
associated with the least processing effort (Rosch 1978). In
the particular scenario of a WS, we argue that the way vague
terms are presented leads the reader to interpret them con-
sidering prototypical instances fitting the described scenario.
For instance, when one reasons about the WS (2) involving
the trophy and the suitcase, it is not necessary to worry about
a precise semantic commitment for the notion of larger, but
instead to evaluate the sentence considering clear cases that
satisfy most of the possible interpretations.
Some of the previously discussed approaches work along
similar lines, using general commonsense rules and a notion
of correlation which appeal to a sense of typicality. However,
we believe that this should be more nuanced and that the deep
semantics of different interpretations should be preserved.
Hence, we propose an approach using ideas from prototype
theory (Rosch and Mervis 1975) to differentiate prototypical
instances of vague terms and relations from borderline cases
within a supervaluationist approach.
Much work has been done on how to pinpoint prototypical
members of categories, mainly using vector analysis or con-
ceptual spaces to find the centroid of a concept (Verheyen,
Ameel, and Storms 2007; Lenci 2011). However, it is not
clear how one could reason with this to resolve a WS, and
further, we are not only interested in picking a prototypical
example from a category, say from the class ‘pet’ or ‘things
that we eat’. Instead, we would also like to find prototypical
instances of relations that can be used to compare an infinite
number of objects. Although there is some work done on
vector analysis for relationships between words (Mikolov,
Yih, and Zweig 2013), in particular for analogy problems,
it does not appear to be applicable to this sort of reasoning
problem.
Suppose we have a vague term, like ‘smaller’. How can we
decide on prototypical instances of this relation? Adopting
the supervaluation approach we would have a collection of
precise interpretations of its meaning. Following motivation
from (Rosch and Mervis 1975) — considering shared proper-
ties of classes — in an ideal scenario prototypical instances
of ‘smaller’ share properties across all instances of ‘smaller’
i.e. a prototypical instance of smaller is considered smaller
in all plausible interpretations. Consider the definitions for
‘smaller’ given in (Davis 2013):
1. Smaller(a, b) ≡ VolumeOf (a) < VolumeOf (b)
2. Smaller(a, b) ≡ DiameterOf (a) < DiameterOf (b)
3. Smaller(a, b) ≡ a ⊂ b
4. Smaller(a, b) ≡ ∃s(s > 1 ∧ b = Scale(a, s))
In this scenario, there are certainly pairs of objects that fall
into all four categories (e.g. a sphere of radius 1 is smaller
than a sphere of radius 2 in all the above senses). Hence,
it would be appropriate to take the conjunction of all four
definitions as a requirement for an instance to be considered a
prototypical case of ‘smaller’. However, in certain scenarios
it may be inappropriate to take the conjunction in this way,
as some definitions may be conflicting. In this case different
metrics can be proposed for selecting prototypes that satisfy
most of the interpretations.
Finally, our main claim in this section is twofold. On the
one hand, we consider that an understanding of typicality
is necessary for commonsense reasoning — that by default
we should consider prototypes. On the other hand, a process
which can only reason over prototypical definitions is clearly
flawed in many respects as it creates over-simplification. Hu-
mans often use context to help narrow definitions, for ex-
ample defining ‘smaller’ in a particular way makes sense
when talking about ‘fitting in’. Hence we believe that a good
approach should reflect the diversity of possible interpreta-
tions of vague terms and that an engine based on pragmatics
should guide the selection of appropriate alternatives when
the prototype is not suitable.
Heuristics standing in for pragmatics
In this paper we have discussed some approaches proposed
for the WSC relying on heuristic methods in different ways
(Rahman and Ng 2012; Peng, Khashabi, and Roth 2015;
Liu et al. 2016). Overall, we concluded that heuristics do
not provide satisfactory solutions when reduced to evaluating
shallow semantic notions such as correlation.
Instead, as has been argued, we believe that a good solution
to the WSC should disambiguate the pronoun by considering
the most plausible configuration of the scenario described,
and the process of finding it should incorporate rich syntactic,
semantic and pragmatic considerations. However, although
advocating deeper semantics and symbolic based approaches
that allow for the kind of reasoning that we want (see section
above), we propose that heuristic methods have a key role
in the WS resolution: that of simplifying the space of pos-
sibilities and estimating reasonably good configurations of
precisifications and necessary assumptions about the world.
As we have highlighted above in order to carry out satis-
factory reasoning we believe a system should give preference
to both commonsense assumptions about the world as well as
prototypical interpretations of the terms involved. These how-
ever should only be preferences rather than concrete rules.
When to accept or reject these default assumptions requires
knowledge and pragmatic understanding. The ability for this
complex mix of pragmatics and world knowledge to con-
tradict itself means that possible solutions or configurations
of a described scenario are not unique. For example, when
discussing the issue of throwing a school bag in a swim-
ming pool above, the implausibility of throwing a school
bag through water outweighed the assumption of Tom and
Ray being in the same place. However, we may also consider
that the assumption of characters being in the same place
outweighs the usual interpretation of ‘throw down’ and ‘top’:
supposing Tom and Ray are both stood in the swimming pool,
we may interpret ‘throw down’ as ‘throw horizontally away
from the end of the swimming pool’ and ‘top of the swim-
ming pool’ to denote the end of the swimming pool. The
result would then be to disambiguate the pronoun as ‘Tom’
rather than ‘Ray’. This second interpretation is not wrong,
however when ‘throw down’ and ‘top’ are interpreted in their
usual way there is a plausible inference that Tom and Ray
are not both located in the swimming pool. This would then
be an example of a ‘conversational implicature’ (Grice 1975)
and explain why the writer of the sentence did not explicitly
give Tom and Ray’s initial locations. Hence in the first inter-
pretation we have a good explanation for violating the default
that Tom and Ray are located in the same place and we also
interpret all the terms in a usual fashion, therefore making
this interpretation appear to be the valid one.
Being able to leverage these kinds of inferences is an im-
portant and difficult task in commonsense reasoning. Along
these lines, one avenue (Schu¨ller 2014) adopted in tackling
the WSC has been to explore relevance theory (Sperber and
Wilson 2004). This theory, inspired by Grice’s work, is based
on the idea that an utterance can have a variety of interpre-
tations, and that it is through parsing, disambiguating terms,
resolving pronouns and adding pragmatic inference as well
as appropriate assumptions based on context that one can
comprehend the meaning of an utterance. The principle guid-
ing these tasks is the idea of maximizing relevance4. Schu¨ller
uses these ideas to motivate a heuristic process for reasoning
over graphs, where a fitness function is employed to find rel-
evant combinations that provide a disambiguation. Moreover,
the resulting graph can be read off to get some idea of how
4An input is said to be relevant if a worthwhile conclusion is
drawn from it. An input is more relevant if it yields a greater positive
cognitive effect for less processing effort.
it came to that disambiguation, potentially satisfying Mor-
genstern and Ortiz’s requirement of a simple explanation. In
spite of being preliminary research, in our view its reasonable
results suggest that fruitful work can be done in further devel-
oping heuristic methods to assess the pragmatic and semantic
considerations that govern reasonable disambiguations of
natural language.
To conclude this section, it is our claim that this use of
heuristics is much more in keeping with the nature of the
WSC. That what should be simplified in order to keep the
task manageable is not so much the deep semantics of natural
terms, but the process of selecting and integrating relevant
interpretations and background knowledge in the particular
context of the resolution of each sentence.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the nature of the WSC as
a benchmark, highlighting the shortcomings of several cur-
rent approaches and providing motivation for a more detailed
level of knowledge. We have also analysed some of what we
consider to be key challenges, in particular drawing attention
to the need to take account of pragmatic considerations. To
begin addressing these challenges, we have suggested using
frameworks able to support the detailed semantics of natural
terms while accounting for its vagueness. Moreover, that their
complexity can be manageable with the use of prototypes,
which should be identified and used by default, and, finally,
that heuristic methods can be used to incorporate varying
semantic interpretations as well as assumptions about the
world, which maintain the pragmatic principles of coopera-
tive communication.
In conclusion, it is our view that, while heuristic mecha-
nisms are necessary to deal with natural language and to re-
duce the complexity of commonsense reasoning, they should
not be used to over-simplify the semantics of natural terms.
Instead, we believe that applications along the lines of the-
oretical studies in pragmatics can play a significant role in
the selection of good interpretations of natural terms and
to enrich the provided descriptions of the world with the
appropriate implicit knowledge.
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